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Philosophy of Intellect and Vision
in the De anima of Themistius

Themistius (317–c. 387) was born into an aristocratic family and ran a paripatetic school of philosophy in Constantinople in the mid-fourth century, between 345 and 355. He made use of Alexander’s De anima in his
commentary on the De anima of Aristotle, which is considered to be the earliest surviving commentary on Aristotle’s work, as Alexander’s commentary
itself did not survive. Themistius may also have been influenced by Plotinus,
and Porphyry (232–309), whom he criticizes. Themistius refers often to
works of Plato, especially the Timaeus, and attempts a synthesis of Aristotle
and Plato, a synthesis which was continued in the Neoplatonic tradition. As
it has been seen in Alexander that thought and perception are intimately connected, almost identical, Themistius goes to much greater length to differentiate the two. Sense perception must be distinguished from reasoning,
because all animals are capable of sense perception, while only humans are
capable of reasoning; while there are only five kinds of sense perception,
there are many varieties of the capacity for reasoning; and the functions of
sense perception and reasoning can be differentiated.
In contrasting sense perception and reason, Themistius does not distinguish between the types of reason as established in the Aristotelian tradition:
intellect (nous), thinking (noêsis), capacity for reasoning (logikê dunamis),
and discursive thinking (dianoia). Thinking is divided into the capacity for
imagination and the capacity for judgment, and the two are clearly distinguished, as belief and assent play no role in imagination. Imagination is that
part of thinking which is most closely related to sense perception, because
imagination depends on the reception of the image, the species sensibilis,
and the retention of the image in thought, the mnemic residue. Imagination is
a necessary precondition for intellect, but the two must still be distinguished.
Imagination is the process in which an image or phantasma “comes to exist
in us” (De anima 89)1 as an imprint or tupos and “form of the sense-
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impression” or aisthêma in the soul or anima rationalis. It is concluded from
this that imagination is a capacity or hexeis of the soul for discernment, excluding the faculties of belief or assent. Imagination must be a faculty for
discernment for Themistius because the phantasma must be in part a product
of thought and not just a pure imprint of the sensible object; it must be a species apprehensibilis, an intelligible, and not just a species sensibilis.
A similar relation between the phantasma and intellection can be found
in the thought of Robert Grosseteste. In the treatise De statu causarum, the
anima rationalis is described as an incorporeal intelligence mediating corporeal virtus, the motion of which in the senses are the phantasmata, mnemic
residues of sense impressions, of the imaginatio. In the treatise De motu supercaelestium, the faculty of sense perception is controlled by the vis apprehensiva of the anima rationalis; sense perception is seen more as a function
of intellection than as distinguished from it; sense perception in the human
being must be different than sense perception in the animal. Sense perception
is assisted by sensus communis; imaginatio, the formation of the phantasmata in the oculus mentis; and memoria, the retention of the traces or mnemic
residues of the phantasmata; as such sense perception allows knowledge to
be possible, following Aristotle: the scientia, knowledge gained by abstraction in reason, and the intellectus, the knowledge of first principles or intelligibles; but sense perception is not the cause of knowledge. Sense perception
alone cannot apprehend universals, which are the materials of knowledge.
The phantasma of sense perception alone cannot produce intellection, as for
Themistius. Because the species sensibilis, the form of the object, in sense
perception is connected to material objects for Grosseteste, sense perception
restricts the incorporeal virtus of intellectus to a certain extent, as it might for
Themistius.
In the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Grosseteste, the intelligentia, as the highest part of the anima rationalis, has complete knowledge
of both singulars and universals, because it is illuminated by a radiated light,
the irradiatio spiritualis, or lumen spiritualis, and it is separated from the
clouded body in sense perception, in the same way that the anima rationalis
is separated from the body. The phantasma in sense perception is clouded in
its connection to the corporeal, sensible object, and as such cannot facilitate
intellection of itself. But intelligentia is separated from the phantasmata of
corporeal objects in the imagination, or imaginatio, the lower function of intellectus. Sense perception supports the anima rationalis, but it is lower and
separated from it, as in Themistius; but for Grosseteste it is caused by it ra-
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ther than being the cause of it, in contrast to Themistius. The virtus scitiva
and virtus cogitativa, the lower functions of discursive reason in intellect as
described by Grosseteste, are more weighed down by the corporeal species
sensibilis in the phantasmata of the imaginatio, and are limited in their abilities of intellection. Through the corporeal experience of sense perception, the
knowledge on the part of the anima rationalis of the phantasmata as mnemic
residues in the imaginatio or phantasia of the mind’s eye or oculus mentis is
clouded or forgotten, and the anima rationalis is not aware of the correspondence being made in intellection in the process of perception, and takes the
sense perception to be immediate of the sensible object, as the anima rationalis is weighed down by its corporeity. This is the definition of the distinction between discursive thinking or dianoia in the logikê dunamis, and
noêsis in nous, between the sensible and intelligible.
In the Hexaemeron of Grosseteste, “Our memory, when it has received
and retained a memory form, is not always actually remembering” (VIII, IV,
12),2 as it is in a state of passive intellection, tied to its corporeity. But then
“when it passes from not actually remembering to actually remembering,”
that is, when it has been activated by an agent intellect in the irradiatio spiritualis, “it begets and expresses from itself the actual intellection or understanding that is in every way like to itself,” in the activity of active intellect,
virtus intellectiva. The distinguishing of intellection from sense perception
for Grosseteste depends on the activity of the productive intellect as described by Alexander of Aphrodisias, that element of intellect which, as an
agent of active intellect, allows material or potential intellect to be actual, to
separate itself from the corporeal in sense perception, and to be able to
perceive the intelligible in relation to the sense object, the species apprehensibilis in relation to the species sensibilis.
According to Grosseteste, through intellection, and the aspiration of the
anima rationalis to see clearly the intelligentia through the irradiatio spiritualis in the virtus intellectiva, as activated by the active intellect, the anima
rationalis becomes aware of the species apprehensibilis in relation to the
species sensibilis in the process of perception, and it becomes aware of the
relation between human intellect and the sensible world.
The aspectus mentis of Grosseteste is the ability of the mind to grasp
ideas through the perception of visual forms, functioning separately from
sense perception; the ability of the oculus mentis to perceive the intelligible
connected with the species apprehensibilis, which is related to the species
sensibilis, in that for Grosseteste, as for Alexander of Aphrodisias, in con-
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trast to Themistius, the species sensibilis is always already a product of the
species apprehensibilis in intellection in perception. The oculus mentis sees
the intelligible in the irradiatio spiritualis of the intelligentia in Grosseteste’s thought. He explained in the Hexaemeron, “the species begotten in
the fantasy [imagination or imaginatio] of the common sense,” the sensus
communis, “begets of itself a species that is like it in the memory” (VIII, IV,
9), as a trace or mnemic residue, which corresponds to the presently perceived sensible object. Then, “the species that can be apprehended by the
reason, intellect or understanding” (VIII, IV, 10), the species apprehensibilis, projects its likeness (similitudo) in the virtus intellectiva in the process of
perception, illuminated by the inner light, the irradiatio spiritualis, and the
mind connects the begotten likeness with the form perceived, the species
sensibilis. As a result, “effective apprehension” is achieved, which might
correspond to the “capacity for discernment” of Themistius, in contrast to
belief and assent, which are functions of the lower part of the anima rationalis, tied to the corporeal in sense perception, in discursive reason.
In the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics (II.6) of Grosseteste,
memory receives the species sensibilis as integrated and synthesized, as species apprehensibilis, in the sensus communis, and it receives the intentiones
connected with the species, the capacity for discernment of intellect, as detected by the vis aestimativa, a function of the higher anima rationalis. Memoria as a function of intellection involves the imagination, imaginatio or
phantasia, the retention of the species sensibilis, and the memoria proprie
dicta, the retention of the intentiones aestimatae, the function of intellection
not tied to the corporeal, in the integration of the concept formed in the virtus intellectiva to produce the species apprehensibilis. Memory is created
from sense perception, and universals in discursive reason result from memory, but not as separated from particulars; they are separated from particulars
by the virtus intellectiva, as activated by the active intellect.
According to Themistius, sense perception must be distinguished from
imagination because imagination occurs in sleep while sense perception does
not. Imagination thus requires an unconscious thought activity, something
other than discursive reason, but not self-conscious, an element of noesis as a
product of active intellect, intellect from without. While sense perception is
both potential and actual, like material intellect, both tied to the sensible object and incorporeal, potential sense perception, the engagement with the
sensible, corporeal object, does not occur in dreams. Dreams only consist of
the residues of sense perception, the mnemic residues of the traces of the im-
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prints, or enkataleimmata, as the species apprehensibilis, involving the intelligible as a product of active intellect. In The Interpretation of Dreams, Sigmund Freud described the formation of a dream image as a combination of
the mnemic residue or visual residue of sense perception, the “thing presentation” (Sachvorstellung, or Dingvorstellung), and the auditory residue in
thinking, the “word presentation” (Wortvorstellung). Both the Sachvorstellung and the Wortvorstellung are incorporeals, intelligibles as the species
apprehensibilis, disconnected from sense perception. Both are the Vorstellungsrepräsentanz, the representation of the representation, the product of
intellection in noesis.
The formation of the dream image involves the transition from the “latent content,” the thought in the dream or the Wortvorstellung, to the “manifest content,” the visual image of the dream or Sachvorstellung, in a “concern
for representability,” according to Freud. The coexistence of the Sachvorstellung and the Wortvorstellung in the Rücksicht auf Darstellbarkeit, in the
writing of the dream, is a “double inscription” (Niederschrift) which involves condensation and displacement, linguistic mechanisms in discursive
reason. The Niederschrift is the quality of the hieroglyph, the simultaneity of
the word and the image, which would be impossible to comprehend in discursive reason itself. The manifest content is the content of the memory of
the dream, the mnemic residues of sense perception, while the latent content,
the “dream thought,” is the product of the conceptual analysis of the dream
in discursive reason. The latent content of the dream is not a content of the
memory of the dream itself, but something which is ascribed to it by conscious thought.
Freud sees a direct relationship between the dream thought and the
dream content in the same way as there is a direct relationship between the
signifier and the signified in linguistics, the sound of the word and the idea
associated with the word, as sensible object and intelligible, as two sides of a
piece of paper, and the transcription between the two is governed by a complex system of rules which operates according to a logic which does not always correspond to discursive or conscious reason. The mechanisms of
representation in the dream, as they are developed between the dream
thought and the dream image, are different from conscious mechanisms of
representation in the intersection of perception and language, although the
mnemic residues of dream memories are derived from those of sensible perception, and the linguistic mechanisms of representation in the unconscious,
or in noesis, are derived from conscious language, as they might be made ac-
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tual by an active intellect.
Dream thoughts and dream content are for Freud, in The Interpretation
of Dreams, “two versions of the same subject-matter” presented in two different languages in a kind of transcript “whose characters and syntactic laws
it is our business to discover by comparing the original and the translation”
(pp. 311–312).3 Dream content is seen as a “pictographic script, the characters of which have to be transposed individually into the language of dream
thoughts” in a signifying relation. Relations between dream images depend
on relations between dream thoughts in a syntactical matrix based on discursive reason. The mechanism of the transposition from dream thoughts to
dream images is labeled imagination by Freud, as Themistius described imagination as the process in which a phantasma comes to exist in us as a tupos
or aisthêma in the anima rationalis, involving the faculty of discernment,
and Grosseteste described the anima rationalis as an incorporeal intelligence
mediating corporeal virtus, the motion of which in the senses are the phantasmata of the imaginatio.
Themistius points out that it is difficult to distinguish between the activity of perception and the activity of imagination in relation to the sense object
as it is perceived, that is, between the species sensibilis and the species apprehensibilis, and the activities of discursive reason and nous. Such a distinction would require a consciousness of the influence of active intellect, and a
self-consciousness of reason in perception. Imagination is active while sense
perception focuses on the object; sense perception acts on the sensible object
as imagination acts on sense perception. The imprint is formed as species
sensibilis and species apprehensibilis simultaneously, but the species apprehensibilis endures in memoria while the species sensibilis does not. As in the
Republic of Plato, when “the mind’s eye [oculus mentis] is fixed on objects
illuminated by truth and reality [species apprehensibilis, illuminated by active intellect, or by intelligentia in the irradiatio spiritualis of Grosseteste], it
understands and knows them, and its possession of intelligence [active intellect] is evident; but when it is fixed on the twilight world of change and decay [species sensibilis, phantasma], it can only form opinions [the belief and
assent of Themistius], its vision is confused and its opinions shifting, and it
seems to lack intelligence” (508d5).
For Grosseteste, in the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, because
the species sensibilis, the form of the object, in sense perception is connected
to material objects, sense perception restricts the incorporeal virtus of intellectus to a certain extent. The intelligentia, active intellect, as the highest part
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of the anima rationalis, has complete knowledge of both singulars and universals, particulars and intelligibles, because it is illuminated by a radiated
light, the irradiatio spiritualis, or reflected light, the lumen spiritualis, and it
is separated from the heavy, clouded body in sense perception, in the same
way that the anima rationalis is separated from the body. As such, intelligentia is separated from the phantasmata of corporeal objects in the imaginatio,
the lower function of intellectus, and from the corporeal functions created in
the relation between the virtus intellectiva and the phantasmata: the objects
of sense perception are to sense perception as sense perception is to intellect,
as for Themistius. The corporeal function in mind is the affectus mentis, the
state created by images of perception, phantasmata, as constructed in the virtus cogitativa or virtus scitiva, the functions of discursive reason. Sense perception supports the anima rationalis, but it is lower and separated from it,
and is caused by it rather than being the cause of it, like the phantasmata in
relation to the imaginatio, as for Themistius.
According to Grosseteste, the body corrupts the purity of the eye of the
soul, the oculus mentis, making it cloudy and heavy. The virtus of the anima
rationalis tends to be focused on bodily and material things, and such a focus
tends to lull the virtus of the higher intelligences, the virtus intellectiva, to
sleep, or to minimize the activity of the active intellect, restricting the incorporeal virtus, and restricting the ability of intellectus to engage the virtus intellectiva and aspire to or be open to the intelligentia; in other words,
restricting the effect of the productive intellect on the material intellect, in
relation to active intellect. The virtus scitiva and virtus cogitativa are more
weighed down by the corporeal species sensibilis in the phantasmata of the
imaginatio, and are limited in their abilities of intellection.
In the De anima of Themistius, the relation between the object of sense
perception and sense perception is the same as the relation between sense
perception and imagination in part because both require the imprinting of the
species, the former being the species sensibilis, the latter being the species
apprehensibilis, functioning as the Vorstellungsrepräsentanz of Freud, the
representation of a representation. Themistius compared the species apprehensibilis to the print of a wax block on air, the wax block being the phantasia, “just as though the wax received the imprint of the seal right through
itself, and after receiving the imprint and being enfolded in it had gone on to
stamp the same imprint on the air” (De anima 92), the result being that “even
though the wax and ring had gone away, the surrounding air had acquired a
structure,” the intelligible structure. The enfolding of the phantasia in ma-
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terial intellect constitutes the process of actualization or entelechy of the material intellect to active intellect, in the perfection of the imagination through
sense perception: imagination is “perfected by progressing to actuality
through the agency of sense perception, just as sense perception is through
the agency of the objects of perception.” Alexander of Aphrodisias described
sensation, or sense perception, as that which “takes place by means of the
apprehension of the forms of sensible objects without their matter,” which
“must be conceived of as taking place in the way in which a piece of wax
takes on the impress of a signet ring…” (Alexander’s De anima 83).
In the De anima of Themistius, to the extent that phantasia is composed
in part of material intellect, the material intellect can be seen as the wax
block or piece of wax which receives the imprint or tupos of the phantasma
or species of the sensible object. The material or potential intellect “must
therefore be, while impassible,” that is, unmoved by belief or assent, “capable of receiving the form of an object” (De anima 94). In order to receive the
form of an object, the species sensibilis, the material intellect in sense perception “must be potentially identical in character with its object.” The material intellect must potentially perceive the species apprehensibilis in order
to perceive the species sensibilis; it must potentially have an idea of the object in order to receive the form of the object in perception. In this way
“thinking is analogous to perceiving,” and intellect is affected by the object
of intellect, the species apprehensibilis, as perception is affected by the object of perception, the species sensibilis. In this way intellect is perfected, by
“being advanced from potentiality to actuality,” through the mechanisms of
sense perception.
In that material intellect is impassible or unchangeable, but experiences
affection at the same time, it must “not have a structure of its own but be capable of receiving every form,” like the blank writing tablet described by Alexander of Aphrodisias in De anima 84, with a propensity to receive
intelligible forms, or by Aristotle in De anima 3.4.429b30–430a10, with no
characters written on it. Themistius distinguishes between the affection of
the material intellect and the perfection of it. The material intellect is perfected as if it were letters “written on a tablet that has nothing actually written on it” (De anima 97). The potential intellect, as the tablet, is perfected
without being affected, “since it has received that for which it came into existence,” but remains unchanged, because it is impassible, but must be capable of receiving the form of the object in sense perception. The potential
intellect is perfected as actual intellect when it is “active towards the intellig-
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ible objects,” and as such it must be “unmixed and uncompounded,” incorporeal. While the thought of the potential intellect cannot be identical to the
object of the thought, because potential intellect “is actually none of the
things that exist,” actual intellect comes into existence simultaneously with
the thoughts which come into existence for potential intellect, like the letters
written on the tablet with nothing written on it, thus actual intellect is identical with the object of thought. The potential intellect is not affected by the
objects of thought, but rather becomes them, or identical to them as actual
intellect.
The material intellect for Themistius cannot be identical to the objects
that it thinks; it must remain potentially all things, which differentiates it
from actual intellect, through the influence of productive intellect, which becomes identical to the objects that it thinks. The material intellect is “none of
the objects that exist prior to its thinking” (De anima 94), and is thus not real
or actual, but potential. Intellect as both material and actual can be compared
to a line which is both bent and straight, one line in two different states. The
actual intellect is as the straight line, uncompounded, while the material intellect is as the bent line, compounded and doubled, since it must contend
with both matter and form. In the De Lineis of Robert Grosseteste, the treatise on lines, angles, and figures, a cosmology in which Grosseteste describes the formation of matter in geometrical terms, virtus or power
proceeds from a natural agent along either a straight line or a bent line. The
action of the virtus is greater along a straight line, as was established by
Aristotle in Book V of the Physics, where a straight line is the shortest path
between two points, and in Book V of the Metaphysics, where the straight
line is more unified than the bent line.
Nature always takes the shorter of two possible paths, according to Grosseteste, because the virtus is greater. The evenness of the straight line is preferable to the unevenness of the bent line, because no angle is formed,
according to Grosseteste, as was established by Aristotle in the Metaphysics.
If a line is bent in nature (as when light is refracted, for example), then it will
have more than one virtus, because the virtus is complete along the straight
line, and become compounded. The bent line occurs when either the receiving passive body is too dense to allow the passage of the virtus, and the line
of action is reflected back, at an angle equal to the angle of incidence, or the
receiving body is rarefied enough to allow the passage of the line of action,
but alters its direction. These properties can be applied to both lines in matter
and lines in perception, that is, to the species sensibilis and the species ap-
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prehensibilis, and to the relation between material intellect and actual intellect, between the compound object of thought and the uncompounded object
of thought, the intelligible.
Aristotle compared the activities of the intellect to a straight line and a
bent line, according to Themistius. While Plato in the Timaeus compared the
activities of the intellect to circular motion and rectilinear motion, in the contrast between the celestial spheres and the sublunary spheres, and between
the intelligibles and discursive reason, in Aristotle the bent line corresponds
to intellect when it becomes engaged in matter and becomes doubled, or embodied, in the manifestation of the virtus intellectiva as the ratio for Grosseteste, and the manifestation of the species apprehensibilis as the species
sensibilis. When the intellect thinks about a compound, a material object, it
becomes compounded, as a bent line, and when it thinks about a form or
species, it becomes uncompounded, as a straight line, in the more complete
virtus intellectiva, actual intellect.
The active intellect perfects the material intellect in the same way that a
craft perfects matter in architecture or sculpture, according to Themistius.
All things in nature consist of “a matter which is potentially all the particulars included” (De anima 98), the material substrate, including potential intellect, and “a cause which is productive in the sense that it makes them all,”
the active intellect. The potential house and potential sculpture as material
substrate receive their structure through the craft of architecture or sculpture,
through the application of the virtus of the craft, and the imposition of the
form of the craft on the material, as active intellect imposes the intelligible
form, species apprehensibilis, on the sensible object, through the corporeal
form, the species sensibilis, in the activation of potential intellect. In that
way the house and sculpture are brought to completion as compounds, as potential intellect is brought to completion. The craft is in a state of perfection,
like active intellect, and the house or statue are brought to a state of perfection through it. Active intellect “moves the potential intellect analogously to
the craft…” The craft is separate and unaffected, like active intellect. The
matter of the house or sculpture is unaffected and impassible, but is brought
to perfection, like material intellect, through the craft.
In the Enneads, Plotinus asked, “On what principle does the architect,
when he finds the house standing before him correspondent with his inner
ideal of a house, pronounce it beautiful? Is it not that the house before him,
the stone apart, is the inner idea stamped upon the mass of exterior matter,
the indivisible exhibited in diversity?” (I.6.3), the intelligible in the sensible.
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Plotinus likewise differentiated the matter from the form; it is the indivisible,
incorporeal form, the intelligible, which defines the matter as architecture, in
contrast to the diversity of particulars in matter in which the architecture may
be perceived. Diverse parts in matter are gathered together and given shape
by the Ideal Form for Plotinus, the incorporeal intelligible. Matter in itself is
without shape or species, “But where the Ideal-Form has entered, it has
grouped and coordinated what from a diversity of parts was to become a unity” (I.6.2). The medium by which the Ideal Form acts is the active intellect
in the anima rationalis, which carries out the Ideal Principle, or the Intellectual Principle, and grasps and molds things.
In Plotinus, the anima rationalis is to the physical universe as the architect is to the house. The house is created by the anima rationalis of the architect as the universe is created by the World Soul, the anima mundi;
Intellectual Principle descends into Reason Principle, as material intellect is
activated by active intellect and discursive reason is able to understand intelligibles, and the beauty of the Good descends into physical form, from the
mind of the architect to the house. The house, like the universe, is “ensouled;
it has a soul which does not belong to it, it is mastered, not the master, possessed, not possessor. The universe lies in soul which bears it up, and nothing is without a share of soul” (Enneads IV.3.9). The house is a part of the
architect, of the mind of the architect, but is separated from its source, as its
matter is impassible. The architecture of the house is as the letters on the surface of the tablet on which no letters are actually written, as active intellect;
the architecture of the house is an intelligible, and only exists in the mind of
the architect or the mind of the viewer. The house is in the architect in the
same way that the world is in the anima rationalis. The geometry and mathematics of the house, the vocabulary of the architecture, are a medium by
which the mind of the architect, the anima rationalis, can be understood or
intuited, as for Robert Grosseteste in De lineis, the geometry and mathematics of the architecture of the matter of the universe are a medium by which
the intelligentia can be understood, as an active intellect which illuminates
discursive reason or virtus intellectiva through the lumen spiritualis or irradiatio spiritualis of the Good.
In the Renaissance, Marsilio Ficino proposed, in De amore, “If anyone
asked in what way the form of the body can be like the Form and Reason of
the Soul and Mind,” that is, the species sensibilis can be like the species apprehensibilis, or the thought of actual intellect can be identical to the object
of thought, “let him consider, I ask, the building of the architect” (De amore
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V.5).4 The architect “develops a Reason or Idea, as it were, of the building in
his soul.” The architecture must pre-exist the matter, as the species apprehensibilis must pre-exist the species sensibilis, and active intellect must preexist potential intellect. “Then he builds, as nearly as possible, the kind of
house he has conceived. Who will deny that the house is a body,” as a natural corporeal form, “and that it is very much like the architect’s incorporeal
Idea, in the likeness of which it was built?” (V.5). A house is architecture in
the same way that material substrate is form; an idea is projected onto it, and
it corresponds to a preconceived idea, an a priori archetype or intelligible, in
the mind of the perceiving or thinking subject. As Plotinus described, the artist, through the power of perception, “gathers into unity what still remains
fragmentary, catches it up and carries it within, no longer a thing of parts,
and presents it to the Ideal-Principle as something concordant and congenial”
(Enneads I.6.3).
The relation between craft and matter is the same as the relation between
productive intellect and potential intellect, as “the latter becomes all things,
while the former produces all things” (De anima 99), according to Themistius. But productive intellect is not external to potential intellect in the way
that craft is external to matter. Matter cannot become craft in the way that
potential intellect can become productive intellect, or intellect in habitus. As
actual intellect is added to potential intellect, a compound is created of form
and matter, as well as creativity and matter, which both becomes all things
and produces all things. Potential intellect has the capacity to be other than
matter, while matter does not. The creativity, the capacity to produce all
things in productive intellect, is the dêmiourgia, which involves the virtus
intellectiva or power to become the objects which it thinks. The thinking of
the productive intellect is as the craftsman, the demiurge, with the virtus
through active intellect or intelligentia to comprehend, structure, and produce thoughts, as the arkhêgos, founder of thoughts.
Potential intellect is something (to tode), according to Themistius, as
matter is something, while actual intellect is “what it is to be something” (to
tôide einai, De anima 100), as the sensible object as species in the anima rationalis is what it is to be something. In the same way, the thinking subject
as potential intellect is “I” (to egô), while the thinking subject as actual intellect is “what it is to be me” (to emoi einai). The thinking subject is the “intellect combined from the potential to the actual,” in becoming, in discursive
thought, while “what it is to be me” comes from actual intellect, in producing, in intellection. The potential thinking subject and the actual thinking
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subject are distinct. The actual thinking subject is the product of productive
intellect, which is made possible by potential intellect, which is made possible by the imagination, which is made possible by perception. Perception,
imagination, and potential intellect together can only allow for the potential
thinking subject; productive intellect, as distinct from what makes it possible, alone allows for the actual thinking subject. Productive intellect alone is
a “form of forms,” an incorporeal intelligible, while perception, imagination
and potential intellect are tied to the corporeal and are only substrates, as
matter is only a substrate for the form of a sensible object.
The thought of the material intellect, in discursive reason, is subject to
time, while the thought of productive intellect, actual intellect given by active intellect, is not, as Themistius explains in De anima 101. In the De anima of Aristotle, “in the individual, potential knowledge is in time prior to
actual knowledge” (3.5.430a), subject to time, but outside the individual potential intellect, there is no temporal relation between potential and actual
intellect. Actual intellect is “mind set free from its present conditions…immortal and eternal,” incorporeal. Mind as passive, in its material
potentiality, is destructible and subject to time, as in the ephemerality of the
phantasmata of the species sensibilis, but mind as active is free from its material conditions; the species apprehensibilis is permanent and not subject to
temporal duration. Discursive thinking is equivalent to thinking in time.
As Plotinus explained perception, “nothing will prevent a perception
from being a mental image for that which is going to remember it,” in the
temporal context of the memoria in the imaginatio or phantasia, “and the
memory and the retention of the object from belonging to the image-making
power” (Enneads IV.3.29), in the introduction of active intellect to potential
intellect. Thus, for Plotinus, “it is in this that the perception arrives at its
conclusion, and what was seen is present in this when the perception is no
longer there,” the ephemeral phantasma. “If then the image of what is absent
is already present in this, it is already remembering, even if the presence is
only for a short time.” The introduction of active intellect to material intellect transforms the species sensibilis as subject to time to the species apprehensibilis as free from temporal and corporeal particulars.
In Enneads IV.3.30, “an image accompanies every intellectual act”: an
atemporal species apprehensibilis accompanies an act of discursive reason,
in the transformation from potential to productive intellect. The mechanism
by which the mnemic residue of the phantasma or picture of thought is incorporated into the conceptual, intellective process, the image-making pow-
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er, the dêmiourgia of active intellect, must be, according to Plotinus, language, the mechanism of discursive reason: “the reception into the imagemaking power would be of the verbal expression which accompanies the act
of intelligence.” While the word belongs to discursive thought, it reveals as
logos what lies hidden within, active intellect, beneath the conceptual
processes which can be apprehended by discursive thought itself in material
intellect. “The intellectual act is without parts and has not, so to speak, come
out into the open, but remains unobserved within…” The intellectual act is
without parts just as the sensible object in exterior reality is without parts
once it has been processed in the imagination as species sensibilis. The progression from the multiple and fragmented in sensible objects, as given in
potential intellect, to the whole and continuous as given in actual intellect,
corresponds to the progression from the multiple and fragmented nature of
potential intellect itself, subject to temporal and corporeal limitations, to the
whole and continuous nature of actual intellect, free from the temporal and
corporeal limitations.
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant described time as “the
subjective condition under which all our intuitions take place” (p. 30); the
subjective condition can be seen as the potential intellect, the subjective “I”
(to egô), defined as being prior to the objective, the thinking subject as actual
intellect (to emoi einai), as becoming in the combination of potential and actual intellect, as that which determines the relations and representations of
discursive reason. As time is the subjective condition of intuition for Kant, it
is defined by intuition, “and in itself, independently of the mind or subject, is
nothing” (p. 31). Time can only be seen as a construct of discursive reason,
with no existence outside of discursive reason, as active intellect is free from
time. If the thinking subject were not present as potential intellect, time
would not exist. Time exists objectively as a mechanism to allow the thinking subject to perceive the world, but the world itself does not contain time,
nor does the perceiving subject in actual intellect, in identity with the objects
of thought.
In the De anima, Themistius wrote that when “supervening on potential
sight and potential colors” (98), light “produces both actual sight and actual
colors,” in the same way that “actual intellect advances the potential intellect” (99), and “constitutes its potential objects of thought as actual objects,”
the sensible object as the species sensibilis. The actual object is the enmattered form, the universal derived from the particular, already constituted by
the species apprehensibilis. Before it is illuminated by active intellect, po-
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tential intellect is a “store-house of thoughts,” with no capacity to distinguish
between enmattered forms, make transitions between thoughts, or combine
or divide them, any of the functions of discursive reason. Potential intellect
only “deposits the imprints from perception,” the species sensibilis or tupos,
“and imagination through the agency of memory,” in the form of the trace or
mnemic residue. A phantasma comes to exist as a tupos or aisthêma in the
anima rationalis in imagination, involving the faculty of discernment. When
the potential intellect is encountered by the active intellect, as material objects are encountered by light, the potential intellect becomes the same as the
active intellect, as the material object becomes the same as the form of it
which is perceived. Light functions as the productive intellect, which allows
the potential intellect to develop as intellect in habitus, as described by Alexander of Aphrodisias. As intellect in habitus, material intellect is able to
make transitions and to combine and divide thoughts, and to understand the
intelligible, the species apprehensibilis, which makes discursive reason possible, in its relation to sensible objects.
Potential intelligible thoughts are sense perceptions without the virtus
intellectiva, in Grosseteste’s terms, which become mnemic residues and are
processed by the phantasia; they are illuminated by the active intellect, or
the irradiatio spiritualis of Grosseteste, and are compared to potential colors. Phantasia is the primary image-making faculty, and preserves the impressions in sense perception, when it is illuminated by the active intellect or
virtus intellectiva, and in turn illuminates the imprints of the sense perceptions as intelligibles, as light illuminates colors. It is through phantasia that
the phantasma, or species, comes to exist in intellect as a tupos, imprint, or
morphê, form, of the aisthêma, the sense impression (De anima 89). Themistius reminds the reader that the name for imagination, phantasia, derives its
name from the name for light, phôs, as did Alexander of Aphrodisias in his
De anima 73, referring to Aristotle in De anima 3.3.429a2–3.
According to Themistius, natural light comes from a single source, and
through the “multiplication of species” of Grosseteste, becomes multiple in
different perceiving subjects. The unity and simplicity of the lux spiritualis,
the spiritual light of Grosseteste, becomes multiplicity and diversity in the
lumen, as the unity of the intelligible, in active intellect, becomes multiple in
the sensible, in potential intellect. As the unity of active intellect has no relation to the multiplicity of potential intellect in its corporeal attachment, “the
imperishability of the light shared has no more relation to each organ of sight
than does the eternity of the productive intellect to each of us…” (De anima
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103). The active intellect is that which illuminates (ellampôn), as the irradiatio spiritualis, while potential intellect, being both passive and active, contains what is illuminated (ellampomenoi) and multiple particulars which
illuminate (ellampontes), as agents of productive intellect. The unitary light
of the sun, the lux spiritualis, becomes multiple as it is diffused and reflected
in particulars as the lumen spiritualis, among both sensible objects and the
particulars of discursive reason.
In the Republic of Plato, the light of the sun is analogous to the Good, the
source of the Ideal Form, in Plotinus’ terms, in intelligentia; the light of the
sun is also the source of visibility in sense perception. The light of the Good
is the idea which “gives the objects of knowledge their truth and the knower’s mind the power of knowing…” (Republic 508). While the light of the
sun “bears the same relation to sight and visible objects in the visible realm
that the good bears to intelligence and intelligible objects in the intelligible
realm,” the light of the sun “is not itself sight, it is the cause of sight and is
seen by the sight it causes.” In that the Good is “the source not only of the
intelligibility of the objects of knowledge, but also of their being and reality”
(509), as active intellect, sensible objects cannot exist outside of active intellect, or the extent to which potential intellect can be participant of it, except
as material substrate without form. The Good is “not itself that reality, but is
beyond it”: while potential intellect can be participant of active intellect, and
affected by active intellect, it is separate from it, and can only be participant
of it in time and particulars, subject to the temporal and corporeal conditions
of the anima rationalis.
When intellect thinks an object in matter, the species sensibilis, intellect
and object are distinct, according to Themistius (De anima 97), but when intellect thinks the immaterial object, the species apprehensibilis, as it has become an intelligible through the illumination of the virtus intellectiva, “what
thinks and what is being thought are identical.” The same would be said for
vision: when the perceiver sees the enmattered object, perception and object
are distinct, but when the perceiver sees the species apprehensibilis in the
oculus mentis, the mind’s eye, as again illuminated by the virtus intellectiva
as an intelligible, what sees and what is seen are identical. As Plotinus says
in Enneads I.6.9, “you are now become very vision,” the perceiver becomes
the perceived, when you understand “that only veritable light which is not
measured by space,” the light of the active intellect or irradiatio spiritualis,
in the actualization of nous in vision, in the perception of the species apprehensibilis.
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